Agents from Hungary’s Information Office (IH), stationed under diplomatic cover at the country’s Permanent Representation to the EU, sought to gather information and exert influence inside the European Commission.

Their recruitment tactics included appeals to patriotic duty as well as offers of financial support and career advancement.

The operation was directed from Budapest and overseen by then-government minister János Lázár. It focused on areas sensitive to the Orbán administration, such as disputes over the rule of law, media freedom, and fiscal policy.

According to sources, some diplomats approached Hungarian EU staff without discretion, with one reportedly pushing a Commission employee to sign a collaboration agreement. The network's exposure accelerated after the unmasking of V., the IH’s chief intelligence officer in Brussels, leading to the operation’s collapse in 2017.

The investigation also notes that Olivér Várhelyi — currently an EU Commissioner — was serving as Hungary’s ambassador to the EU while the spy ring was active. Although there is no proof of his direct involvement, sources say he was aware of the intelligence activities taking place under his diplomatic leadership and benefited from their reports.

Belgian counterintelligence agencies now monitor Hungarian operations closely. While Belgium officially maintains Hungary as a “cooperative” partner, insiders describe Hungary increasingly being classified as a “purple country,” reflecting rising concerns about its loyalty within the EU.

Further findings indicate that Hungarian intelligence attempted to penetrate EU security teams and leak internal documents, exploiting the assumption that institutions of member states operate with mutual trust. In response, the European Commission has launched an inquiry into the matter.

This case sheds light on the complex tensions within EU institutions and Hungary’s ongoing political strategies on the European stage.

A Hungarian official working at the European Commission initially regarded the friendly invitations from V., a diplomat at Hungary’s Permanent Representation to the EU, as innocent. Meeting two or three times a year — often in parks — the encounters seemed routine. But V. was not just interested in EU affairs; he also sought gossip spread within the official’s extensive network.

“He was likable and intelligent, but I already knew he was an intelligence officer operating under diplomatic cover,” the official told Direkt36, recalling meetings between 2015 and 2017. Though officially a foreign ministry diplomat, V. was actually an operative of Hungary’s Information Office (IH), the country’s foreign intelligence service.

Eventually, V. revealed his true intentions. In one meeting, he pressed the Commission employee to sign a recruitment agreement to become an official “secret collaborator” of the IH. When money failed to entice, V. offered to secure funding for a cause close to the employee’s heart, suggesting payments could come from another Hungarian state agency. The official declined firmly, expressing willingness to meet but refusing formal recruitment.

Brussels is a major hub for espionage, home not only to the EU but also NATO and many international bodies. However, spying between EU member states inside these institutions is rare. V. and his colleagues’ aggressive recruitment crossed accepted norms for diplomatic conduct, with their reckless approach drawing attention.

In 2017, V.’s exposure as the IH’s head of the Brussels network led to the collapse of Hungary’s spying operation there. EU officials even filed reports about his brazen attempts.

This investigation, based on interviews with numerous insiders and EU officials targeted for recruitment, highlights a previously unknown chapter in the strained relationship between Orbán’s government and EU institutions.

The operation took place while Olivér Várhelyi — now an EU Commissioner — served as Hungary’s ambassador to the EU (2015–2019). Though there’s no proof of his direct involvement, sources say he was aware intelligence officers operated under his purview and used their reports.

Belgian counterintelligence has since stepped up surveillance of Hungarian activities, treating Hungary less as a trusted ally and more as a “purple country” with growing doubts about loyalty.

The IH focused exclusively on recruiting Hungarian nationals working in Brussels-based EU institutions, ignoring foreign staff. Recruitment tactics ranged from promises of money and career benefits to appeals to loyalty. Exactly how many were recruited is unknown.

One Hungarian EU official said the problem lies not in intelligence gathering itself but in using espionage to serve a ruling clique rather than the national interest. Former IH operations reportedly included wiretapping EU investigators probing misuse of EU funds by high-profile figures linked to the Orbán family.

The IH’s foreign intelligence unit, supervised politically by then-Prime Minister’s Office head János Lázár, pursued information on issues critical to the government — media freedom, rule of law conflicts, judicial independence, taxes, and EU fund management. The aim was early warning of Brussels decisions threatening Hungary’s interests.

Every Hungarian employee at the Commission was profiled using state databases and open-source research to identify potential recruitment targets. Initial contacts typically happened in Brussels but meetings moved to Hungary for security reasons.

Western intelligence services began doubting Hungary’s loyalty, recalling the legacy of Soviet-era surveillance practices still influencing some Eastern European states. Belgium’s counterintelligence agency declined to confirm details about V.’s exposure but stressed any espionage against EU institutions is taken seriously.

Between 2013 and 2014, another diplomat, E., tasked with security matters, tried persistently to build a network among Hungarians in EU institutions — asking seemingly casual questions but probing for sensitive information. While these efforts sometimes failed to recruit, officials shared concerns about pressure to influence EU reports to favor Hungary’s government perspective.

At the heart of the IH’s Brussels operations, the IH chief V. officially held a diplomatic post but secretly led the spy network. His reckless behavior, fueled by demands from Budapest for urgent intelligence, led to his downfall. Messages sent over unencrypted channels and blatantly approaching recruits brought EU security services' attention.

Following 2018, after Hungary’s change of government, the IH leadership was overhauled. The current scope of IH activities in Brussels remains unclear.

Though Hungary is officially considered a cooperative partner by Belgian intelligence, concerns about its loyalty have increased due to the Orbán government’s pro-Kremlin stance. Hungary’s intelligence sharing has been downgraded and viewed with skepticism.

Despite this, Hungary continues to expand its diplomatic footprint in Brussels. In 2024, the government opened the House of Hungary near key EU and Belgian government buildings — a cultural center also watched carefully by Belgian intelligence for potential hidden activities.

This investigation underscores the complexities of trust and espionage within the EU, revealing how Hungary’s intelligence operations have tested the boundaries of alliance and loyalty inside the heart of European power.

Original article published on Direkt36
 

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