With the passage of the Act on the Organisation and Administration of Courts and the Act on the Status and Remuneration of Judges, Parliament created a sophisticated legal framework for the standardised, reliable and timely operation of the administration of justice in Hungary, in observance of Hungary’s Fundamental Law. The amendments now approved did not alter this framework.

By virtue of the further clarification of the court laws and the integration of supplementary rules, the administration of justice becomes more effective and transparent; additionally, the monitoring powers of the National Judicial Council over the President of the National Judicial Office have also been reinforced in the area of central administration.

The Hungarian legislation introduced effective as of 1 January 2012 may be classified into the category of “administration by autonomous court agencies that are independent of the executive power”, similar to the practices of several other European countries.

The amendments passed on Monday delegate some of the administrative duties of the President of the National Judicial Office (NJO) to the competence of the National Judicial Council (NJC) and provide further monitoring powers for the NJC in addition to those that already exist. The amendments also serve to enhance the transparency of operations by allowing the Chief Prosecutor, the Chair of the Hungarian Bar Association and the Chair of the Hungarian Chamber of Civil Law Notaries to attend the meetings of the NJC in a consulting capacity, in addition to the Chair of the NJO and the minister responsible for justice.

The amendments now approved also provide an appeal procedure against the results of job applications invited for judicial posts; applicants may submit an appeal to the court of public administration and labour, as part of which the court of public administration and labour verifies the fulfilment of the conditions of appointment and the job application conditions.

For the event of the cessation of a court or the reduction of its competence or area of jurisdiction, the law prescribes that the President of the NJO offer a range of judicial posts to the judges awaiting transfer who may choose from among these. At the same time, the relevant amendment abolishes the circumstance giving rise to exemption that is applicable to the event of the refusal of the judicial post offered, and consequently, the transfer of a judge cannot under any circumstances result in the cessation of the judge’s service relationship.

The relevant rules have also been clarified in connection with the appointment of courts.

The Government and Parliament decided on the development and reinforcement of the new judicial system within the framework of Hungary’s constitutional reorganisation and in the spirit of Hungary’s new Fundamental Law that entered into force on 1 January 2012.

The new law reinforced the independence of the administration of justice and created a reasonable judicial structure. At the same time, the judicial reform makes available the necessary resources and statutory environment for courts for the timely administration of justice. The development of the concept was preceded by a series of conferences organised by the Association of Hungarian Judges with some 1,600 members and their summary findings; other court leaders and the representatives of the other branches of the administration of justice (lawyers, notaries) were also consulted.

The revision of the operation of the judicial system was inevitable as it became obvious that the model introduced by virtue of the 1997 judicial reform did not live up to expectations.

Formerly, the main custodian of the administration of courts was the National Council for the Administration of Justice (NCAJ) which usually met once monthly but was unable to meet its obligation to adopt timely decisions. This prevented the resolution of situations that required immediate attention and hindered the operation of the system.

The President of the National Council for the Administration of Justice was simultaneously the President of the Supreme Court; however, both offices are full-time jobs, and it was difficult to reconcile the administrative duties of the President of the NCAJ with the professional role of the President of the Supreme Court. The members of the NCAJ fulfilled their duties in that capacity in addition to their respective offices held elsewhere and were therefore not sufficiently prepared for the performance of the tasks posed by the over-extended powers of the NCAJ.

At the same time, the judge members of the NCAJ were usually selected from among court leaders, in respect of whom the NCAJ itself was competent to exercise monitoring powers and the employer’s rights. Consequently, court leaders effectively monitored themselves and only exercised control over their respective courts. The President of the NCAJ was in charge of the Office of the NCAJ, however, only indirectly, via the office manager. As a result, the Office often did not function as an agency of the NCAJ but as an independent factor and, due to this indirect supervision, failed to fulfil its preparatory and executive duties to the required standards.

Naturally, these problems also affected the very essence of the activities of court, the administration of justice and its timeliness. The new legislation will put an end to the situation where legal proceedings often went on for years; in fact, it was not infrequent that it took ten years to close a case. This shook the people’s faith and trust in the administration of justice.

Source: Ministry of Public Administration and Justice - kormany.hu